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Abstract
Indiana’s voter identification law is controversial. Supporters argue that the law is
necessary to protect the integrity of elections. Its critics argue that the law suppresses the
votes of racial minorities and other historically marginalized and oppressed groups. The
ensuing legal battle culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court case Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd. This thesis investigates this law’s oppressive intent by utilizing
qualitative, interpretive content analysis. The arguments within the respondents’ case
briefs are interpreted and evaluated through the context in which the law was introduced
and enacted and Iris Marion Young’s five faces of oppression: exploitation,
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. While Young’s faces
focus on experiences, this paper employs them to find language that supports or embraces
those experiences. This study identifies four of the five faces in these case briefs –
violence was not found. Since these faces were found in several arguments, this thesis
concludes that there was oppressive intent in proponents’ arguments for Indiana’s voter
identification law.
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Voter identification laws are a relatively new phenomenon. Implementation of
these laws has grown only since the start of the twenty-first century, but they remain
controversial. Opponents link these laws to previous attempts at voter suppression
whereas proponents argue that they secure electoral integrity. Generally, the literature is
inconclusive about these laws’ suppressive efficacy, but claims of oppression require
investigation. This thesis investigates whether there is oppressive intent behind the law
by subjecting proponents’ arguments for Indiana’s voter identification law to interpretive,
qualitative content analysis. The arguments are interpreted and evaluated through the
context in which the law was introduced and enacted utilizing Iris Marion Young’s five
faces of oppression.
The following sections demonstrate this context and theory, interpret the
arguments, and evaluate them according to theory. The first section lays out Indiana’s
voter identification law in context while the second section covers the discussion on voter
identification. Third, this paper details Young’s theory of justice and oppression. Fourth,
this theory is translated into methods to identify oppressive meaning and intent. Lastly, I
demonstrate that oppressive meaning and intent according to Young’s five faces of
oppression. Ultimately, I hypothesize that Republicans intended to oppress historically
oppressed social groups, and based on my findings, this thought seems to be well
founded.
Indiana’s Voter Identification Law in Context
From denial of its systemic and systematic character (Cole 2020) to protection of
its signifiers and agents, like monuments (King 2020), institutions (Baker and Kaplan
2020), and white supremacists (Phelps 2019), people are attempting to maintain the
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United States’ oppressive regime. This regime is a hierarchy of power and privilege,
dividing and ranking social groups, historically placing able-bodied, heterosexual, cisgender, Christian, old, white men at the top (Strolovitch et al. 2017). Party compositions
even align with these divisions. The Democratic party is forming a coalition of
historically oppressed groups (Oliphant 2019) whereas the Republican party is growing
whiter, more Christian, and more male (Heersink and Jenkins 2020), which are
historically privileged groups. Considering party composition, the Republican party is
expected to represent historically privileged people’s interests. However, many of the
Republican party’s actions transcend typical or acceptable party behavior. The party is
attempting to change rules to give its constituents disproportionate power. Voter
identification laws are one example of these actions.
Through historical analysis, Combs (2016) argues that these laws are attempts to
counter the United States’ changing demographics through voter suppression. As the
United States grows more diverse, benefiting the Democratic coalition, the Republican
party is apparently attempting to limit the influence of historically oppressed groups to
solidify power for the historically privileged. In other words, the Republican party may
be aiming to worsen the United States’ oppressive regime. However, this effort is not
historically charged to Republicans. Throughout America’s history, politics have been
constituted by two racial institutional orders: white supremacist orders and transformative
egalitarian orders. The former order was historically associated with the Democratic
coalition, but it has since been fully embraced within the Republican party (King and
Smith 2005). This project investigates these concerns in voter identification laws.
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In current circumstances, this project aligns with efforts for increased scrutiny and
action against laws that unjustly restrict voting. While these laws are not novel to the
United States, they are on the rise after the 2020 presidential election. Republican
lawmakers are justifying additional voting restrictions through baseless claims of election
fraud that argue the election was stolen (Wines 2021). Recently, Republicans’ effort to
undermine confidence in the United States’ presidential election culminated in the
January Sixth Insurrection, where troves of President Trump’s supporters stormed the US
Capitol Building, forcing federal officials to hide and resulting in five deaths (Healy
2021). After these events, the House of Representatives impeached President Trump.
While the Senate acquitted him, the vote marked the most bipartisan vote to impeach and
convict a United States President in history (Blake 2021). With blood spilled in the halls
central to the American experiment and calls to overturn a duly elected government, these
events do not indicate a healthy democracy.
Throughout the United States, Republicans are making conscious efforts to
immobilize voters, especially Democratic constituencies. In the 2020 election cycle,
Democrats voted disproportionately by mail. This trend is clearly in response to health
concerns arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. While previous elections demonstrated
no partisan benefit related to voting by mail (Karp and Banducci 2000; Thompson et al
2020; Epstein and Saul 2020), Republicans overwhelmingly chose to vote in person since
President Trump and his allies constantly berated the merits of voting by mail (Epstein
and Saul 2020; Weiser and Ekeh 2020). The onslaught of voting law reforms in
Republican controlled legislatures clearly coincide with Democrats’ use of mail-in voting
during the 2020 election (Pew Research Center 2020). These efforts to immobilize are
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not new to conservative politicians, however. For decades, Republicans have openly
indicated their support for less democratic participation. In 1980, Paul Weyrich, an
influential conservative and co-founder of the Heritage Foundation, said, “I don’t want
everybody to vote. As a matter of fact, our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes
up as the voting populace goes down” (Berman 2011). The Heritage Foundation
continues to play an influential role in election reform: lobbying state Republican
lawmakers to introduce and enact many of their election reform priorities in the shadow
of the 2020 election, for instance (Corasaniti and Epstein 2021).
Nevertheless, that election was not the first to spark controversy that resulted in
election reform. Two decades ago, the controversial 2000 election between then
Governor of Texas George Bush and Vice President Al Gore spurred calls for changes to
the United States’ elections. These calls generated the Help American Vote Act (HAVA).
This bipartisan act was meant to improve the voting process by replacing voting
machines, reforming voter registration, and increasing access to polls, to name a few. It
also included voter identification requirements to prevent fraud (Legal Information
Institute n.d. a).
Indiana’s voter identification was framed as effort to comply with HAVA. When
Senate Enrolled Act 483 was signed into law in 2005, it was the strictest photo voter
identification law in the country (Indianapolis Star 2005b). While five other states
required photo identification at the time, these states offered more alternative forms like
school IDs and utility bills. Indiana’s law only allowed federal or state issued photo
identification. Voters could complete a provisional ballot on Election Day, but that vote
would only count if these voters verified their identity by displaying photo identification
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at their county clerks’ office by the Monday after the election or signed a religious
exemption form (2005a).
While these routes offered some leeway, they ignored how difficult it was to
obtain a form of photo identification in Indiana. In 1991, Indiana’s Bureau of Motor
Vehicles attempted to decrease fraudulent state IDs by decreasing valid forms of
verification, mostly accepting things that included photos (Fahy 1991). Mary Anderson,
who was the interim Executive Director of the Lafayette Urban Ministry in 2005,
informed lawmakers that getting a photo ID is often a paradoxical experience; people
need a birth certificate to get a state issue photo identification, but people need a photo ID
to get their birth certificate. People also must pay a fee to get their birth certificate. In
2004, the Lafayette Urban Ministry received 150 requests for help obtaining photo ID,
but fewer than seventy-five received one (McNeil 2005). Considering these difficulties,
many Democratic lawmakers and activists voiced their opposition.
When the bill was being considered in Indiana’s House of Representatives,
Democrats and Republicans bitterly debated it for three hours. Republicans argued that
the bill was necessary to ensure voter confidence and decrease voter fraud (Indianapolis
Star 2005a). While there was not widespread evidence of voter fraud, the Madison
County Democratic Party Chairman was arrested for twelve counts of voter fraud in 2004
(2004d), and voter fraud and election integrity were common talking points for
Republicans even before this instance (Tully 2003). Democrats argued that this bill aimed
to decrease turnout by making voting more difficult (McNeil 2005). During the debate,
Democrats even made comparisons to the KKK and America’s history of voter
suppression, suggesting that Indiana Republicans were participating in a nationwide
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campaign to suppress minority voters (Indianapolis Star 2005a). This argument coincided
with increasing minority population percentages in Indiana (Kinghorn 2008). Democrats
also argued that this bill does not treat people equally, giving some people exemptions
while making it harder for poor people to vote (Indianapolis Star 2005a). Ultimately,
Indiana’s strict photo voter identification law passed Indiana’s House of Representative
and Senate on party line votes. In the House, every present Republican voted in favor and
every present Democrat voted against, resulting in a fifty-two to forty-five vote in favor
(Indianapolis Star 2005a). In the Senate, every Republican voted in favor and every
Democrat voted against concurring the changes made by the House, meaning the
Senate’s thirty-three to seventeen vote sent the bill to the governor for signature (2005b).
Republicans were able to pass this bill without any Democratic support because
they controlled both chambers of Indiana’s General Assembly and the governor’s office.
In recent years, Indiana has largely been considered a safe Republican state. Currently,
they have a super majority in both Indiana’s House and Senate, meaning Democrats
cannot even prevent a quorum (Davies 2020). However, that trifecta was not always the
case. In 2004, Republicans were extremely successful in Indiana’s elections. Before the
election, Indiana’s governor was a Democrat, and Democrats controlled the House by a
slim fifty-one to forty-nine majority (Indianapolis Star 2004b). Republicans have
controlled Indiana’s Senate since 1978 (Ballotpedia n.d.). Republicans overturned that
slim House majority, controlling the House for the first time since 1996. When they
controlled both chambers from 1996 to 1998, Republicans pursued a controversial
agenda, prompting two protest demonstrations at Indiana’s Statehouse (2004b).
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However, the circumstances in 1996 were different because the governor was a
Democrat. In 2004, Mitch Daniels, a Republican from Indianapolis, left the Bush
Administration to run for governor in Indiana, and he became Indiana’s first Republican
governor in sixteen years (2004c). Since 2004, Republicans have not lost a gubernatorial
election, and while Democrats controlled Indiana’s House from 2006 to 2010,
Republicans have had a trifecta since 2010 (Ballotpedia n.d.). During the 2004 election,
Republican announced eleven priorities. Of that list, many priorities promised a probusiness agenda. Other notable priorities include a gay marriage ban and a voter
identification requirement (Indianapolis Star 2004a). When they were successfully
elected to their first trifecta in decades, Republicans passed their voter identification
priority (2005b) despite a Democratic boycott that prevented quorum and nearly killed
the bill (Corcoran 2005). Consequently, Democrats promised to sue (Indianapolis Star
2005a).
The Indiana Democratic Party, several elected officials, and many community
groups challenged the law, and they said the state failed to justify the law, which could
burden thousands of poor, elderly, and disabled people. These challengers lost in the
Federal District Court in Indianapolis and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Chicago (Greenhouse 2008). However, the appellant panel was
divided. In his dissent, Judge Terrence Evans argued that Indiana’s voter identification
law was a thinly veiled effort against these historically oppressed groups. Ultimately, the

9

challengers petitioned to the Supreme Court of the United States, losing in a 6-3 decision
(Oyez n.d.). 1
The Discussion on Voter Identification Laws
Voter identification laws require voters to present some form of identification at
the polls to vote. Sometimes these laws mandate that the form of identification include a
photo while others merely require people to verify their identity. Then, these laws are
characterized by the additional steps they require when a voter does not have
identification. Non-strict voter identification laws allow some voters to cast a ballot
without additional effort – they may sign an affidavit, have their signature checked, or
have the poll worker vouch for them. However, strict voter identification laws require
additional effort after the attempt to vote for the ballot to count. For example, voters may
have to present a form of identification to an election official later. If voters in states with
strict voter identification laws do not complete the required additional steps, their vote
will not be counted. Thirty-six states have voter identification laws, and ten of these
states have strict laws, seven of which require photo identification as well (NCSL 2020).
When it was introduced, Indiana’s voter identification law was the strictest in the country
(Indianapolis Star 2005b).
Voter identification laws are controversial. Proponents tend to suggest that voter
identification laws are necessary to ensure the integrity of elections whereas opponents
argue that these laws are meant to suppress historically oppressed voters (Hicks et al.
2015). Generally, the most common argument in favor of voter identification laws relies

The respondents’ case briefs argued in support of Indiana’s voter identification law. Since these
arguments were employed for the final judgment according to the US Constitution, they are employed in
this project to judge the intent of the law according to normative theory on oppression.
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on voter fraud, specifically voter impersonation. This type of fraud occurs when a person
votes under the name of an eligible voter while the person who casts the ballot is, in fact,
not eligible. Voter identification proponents argue that this fraud is rampant in the United
States election system. Studies, nonetheless, have found that this fraud is quite rare
(Ahlquist et al. 2014; Levitt 2014). While these findings are slightly disputed (Richman
2014), the literature overwhelmingly concludes that this problem is overstated. Regarding
the opponents’ arguments, however, there is even more dispute.
Opponents of voter identification laws worry that they suppress voters, especially
voters that belong to historically oppressed groups (Hicks et al. 2015). However, scholars
have been unable to determine these laws’ suppressive efficacy. In a landmark study,
Hajnal, Lajevardi, and Nielson (2017) found that these laws do in fact lessen the turnout
of minority voters. Scholarship on this issue was immersed in conflict after Grimmer,
Hersh, Meredith, Mummolo, and Nall (2018) disputed this landmark study. These
researchers took issue with Hajnal et al.’s (2017) reliance on the Congressional Election
Studies surveys. When Grimmer and his colleagues (2018) used the same test considering
these issues, they came to a different result, finding that voter identification does not
lessen turnout. Therefore, this debate is far from settled.
Nonetheless, critiques of voter identification still have some intuitive appeal
considering the access to identification. Numerous studies display that there are vast
disparities in access to identification; moreover, these studies display that the disparities
are often along racial and ethnic lines (Barreto et al. 2018; GAO 2015). In Indiana,
Barreto et al. find that significant disparities in access to valid identification suggest that
many people are disenfranchised by the voter identification law. Notably, people who are
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predisposed for privilege have the most access (2009). When these known disparities are
considered alongside the United States’ changing demographics (U.S. Census Bureau
2012), voter identification laws seem positioned to limit voting access to an increasing
proportion of the population, hence concern with the intent of these laws.
While the merits of both arguments are disputed, there is little doubt about the
incidence of these laws. Although these laws were once valence issues, 2 now voter
identification laws are uniformly introduced by Republicans (Hicks et al. 2015). Voter
identification bills’ introduction and enaction processes seem to be extremely political,
strategic, and racialized (Bentele et al. 2013). Moreover, the opposition is largely
Democratic, making this issue intensely partisan. However, these bills are not necessarily
passed just because Republicans have control – they are influenced by the political
context. These bills are positively associated with Republican control and political
competitiveness, and they are likely meant to empower Republican’s dwindling
constituency by demobilizing growing minority populations (Hicks et al. 2015). States
are most likely to adopt voter identification laws when the governor’s office and
legislature switches to Republicans (Biggers and Hanmer 2017).
Despite this partisan split, highlighting and investigating these party asymmetries
is not inherently partisan. In fact, these efforts are intellectually honest and increasingly
common. Differences between parties include demographics (Heersink and Jenkins
2020), activism (Carmines and Stimson 1989), financial contributions (Panagopoulos and
Green 2011), and turnout (Hillygus and Shields 2008), for instance. Party positions may
be equivocated for a false sense of non-partisan, unbiased research. Objectively, the
Voter identification laws are still fairly popular within the electorate. Despite opposition from Democratic
officials, many voters agree with requiring photo ID when casting a vote (Rakich 2021).

2
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Republican Party supports voter identification laws, and it argues that these laws address
voter fraud, specifically, from non-citizens. The party’s intention is more debatable. The
Republican party argues that these laws address fraud, but this occurrence is rare
(Ahlquist et al. 2014; Levitt 2014). Hicks et al. (2015) displays that there is some partisan
benefit in these laws, potentially aiding Republican electoral success. Since there are
concerns that these voter identification laws are meant to harm historically oppressed
groups in favor of privilege social groups, they must be considered within theories of
justice, power, and oppression.
Theory on Justice, Power, and Oppression
Perhaps intuition places voter identification laws in discussions of justice, but
scholarly debate is less clear about that categorization. Young argues that this institution
is a product of the late twentieth-century social movements. Classical and predominant
theories of justice tend to focus more on distributions of goods or resources. Young
argues that these theories of justice mistakenly subscribe to the distributive paradigm – a
combination of ideas and practices that suggest social justice is “the morally proper
distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members” (1990).
When considering social movements for justice, these theories limit the scope of
justice in two ways. First, these theories ignore and presuppose institutional context and
social structures. Young argues that by presupposing institutional context, theories of
justice tend to assume centralized and removed policy enactment and enforcement;
therefore, there are few evaluations about just organization of governmental institutions
or just methods of political decision-making (Young 1990). Since an evaluation of voter
identification would often be considered within the institutional context, it may be missed
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by predominant theories of justice. Young’s theory, nevertheless, provides a framework
for consideration that include institutional context and social structures that are relevant
to voter identification in Indiana. Second, distributive theories of justice articulate a static
view of power. This view suggests that any social value is a thing or aggregate that
people possess. That conception focuses on end-state patterns instead of processes and
relations that produce injustice. Essentially, they ignore many experiences that would be
considered unjust, possibly including racism and sexism (Young 1990). Since
investigating oppressive intent in Indiana’s voter identification is more about the
processes of voting than the end-state disenfranchisement, distributive theories are not
adequate. Overall, these distributive theories of justice cannot be used to interpret
proponents’ arguments, but Young’s theory is more applicable.
However, Young’s theory of justice is untold in a positive sense. By criticizing
the distributive paradigm of justice, she elucidates a concept of justice based on social
relations. Justice to Young is “derived from a conception of communicative ethics” in
which everyone has influence in deliberation and decision-making. She describes justice
by its negation: domination and oppression. These concepts elucidate a theory of justice
relating less to distributive patterns but more to structures, relations, and power.
This systemic character is a product of perpetuated structures and institutions.
Oppression is not necessarily exercise through the direct will of a tyrant; it is embedded
in everyday actions. When people act in society, they are often following predetermined
acceptable behaviors or continuing legacies of action. These behaviors and actions are
social processes perpetuated by structures and institutions. Structures are like
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conventions, rituals, and norms whereas institutions are organized laws, rules, and
associations.
According to Young, decision-making structures and procedures, the division of
labor, and culture are three rough aggregates of structures and institutions that are crucial
to justice that cannot be capture by distributive theories because they exist within
institutional context. Decision-making structures and procedures refer to who, through
their position and authority, can influence decisions that organize society and to the rules
by which these decisions arise. These structures and procedures include not only codified
institutions like government but also social hierarchies that affect communities and
households. These procedures include processes like voting, which places voter
identification laws primarily within decision-making structures and procedures.
While the first category of structures and institutions includes voter identification
primarily, these categories overlap and impact each other. Therefore, voter identification
laws may also affect the division of labor and culture. The division of labor can be
distributive or non-distributive. When distributive, this division refers to how jobs, tasks,
and occupations are split between groups and people, but as a structure, it is about the
definition and value of positions. Culture is the meaning attached to people, actions,
gestures, and institutions, among other things. Therefore, culture is everywhere. Through
culture, people express their experiences and understanding of the world. Social groups
make meaning through culture.
According to Young, many theorists fail to accurately conceptualize social
groups. They often characterize them as aggregates or associations. While groups share
some traits of these collectives, their distinctions are crucial for her theory of oppression.
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Social groups are created through relations: they exist in relation to at least one other
group. Members of these groups have shared or similar experiences; therefore, they
develop similar practices and meanings. These similarities compel members to have
affinity for fellow social group members, and they differentiate them from other groups.
These affinities and differences define identity. Consequently, social groups in common
discourse are collectives defined by race, gender, sexuality, ability, and age, to name a
few. The other commonly invoked collectives do not have this complexity (Young 1990).
Aggregates are collectives defined by shared attributes like skin color, language,
or location to name a few. Social groups often include these shared attributes as well, but
that shared attribute is where aggregates end. Groups are centered on shared identity.
They have history and culture, meaning there is more value placed upon them than
similar appearances or background. People within social groups relate to and identify
with collective symbols, practices, and other experiences. For example, Black people are
not only a collective with dark complexion but also groups with shared or similar history,
culture, and experiences. These shared or similar experiences are not monolithic, but they
are generally more relatable than these features for other races (Young 1990).
This relatability expresses social relations, which differentiate social groups. Each
social group is defined in relation to at least one other group. Associations are also
produced by relations. These collectives are differentiated by relations to other
collectives, and there is affinity for members and their shared characteristics. Political
parties are examples of associations. In the United States, Republicans and Democrats are
defined by their relation to each other, and their members generally subscribe to similar
views. Unlike associations, however, groups constitute individuals. Individuals do not
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choose groups like they do associations; instead, individuals find themselves in groups.
The groups to which they belong seem ingrained within their identity. People can change
social groups, but when they do, they experience a transformation of their identity
(Young 1990). This identity serves as sort of social position where people belong to
multiple social groups: there are White men and White women, for example. In that
position, people have differing degrees of power.
In Young’s theory, power is not something that people possess – it is dispersed
throughout society. Young criticizes distributive theories of power for articulating a
concept that can be traded, exchanged, and distributed. That critique does not dismiss that
people have different degrees of power, but power – in Young’s view – is relational, not
substantive. Power, therefore, is product of social processes determined by structures and
institutions. Social groups have differing degrees of power based on their relations to
other groups in the institutional context. Since Young does not explicitly define power,
Allen expands Young’s theory, defining power as “a general capacity to act” (2008). This
definition conveys that power is a potential – people are not required to act to have
power. Instead, people who have greater power are more easily able to influence or act
within society. Despite power being a general capacity to act, it is realized through
actions or processes. When these processes constrain groups, they are unjust (Young
1990).
For Young, justice is concerned with whether society provides the institutional
conditions required for a good life, which must include two general values – selfdevelopment and self-determination. These values require the ability to act; therefore,
they require power. Injustice exists when social relations prevent groups from realizing
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these values. Oppression and domination are experiences of injustice. Oppression
prevents self-development whereas domination prevents self-determination. On this
distinction between oppression and domination, voter identification laws fall strangely
between these diverging yet simultaneously overlapping phenomena. Since they are not
mutually exclusive, some policy or action can be an instance of oppression and
domination. While domination tends to be oppression, not all oppression is domination.
Therefore, if voter identification laws are found to have oppressive intent, they are likely
policies of domination as well. Overall, oppression occurs when structures and
institutions immobilize or diminish groups, but specific experiences of oppression are
elucidated in Young’s five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young 1990).
Exploitation
Young’s first face of oppression is exploitation. From scholars to common use,
exploitation broadly indicates taking advantage of someone’s vulnerabilities.
Exploitation’s tenets have been employed since Saint Thomas Aquinas, but exploitation
as a concept in employer relations was popularized by Karl Marx. Through his labor
theory of value, Marx argues that Capitalists take advantage of laborers by taking the
surplus value from their production (Zwolinski and Wertheimer 2017). While Marx’s
labor theory of value is largely refuted, other scholars continue to use distributive theories
of exploitation. Despite fundamentally disagreeing with baseline assumptions in previous
theories of exploitation, Young employs their tenets in her own concept.
Young argues that these aforementioned theories of exploitation are limited by the
distributive paradigm of justice to which they seemingly subscribe. According to Young,
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exploitation is systematic transfer of powers. In that definition, there are three crucial
thoughts. First, exploitation is systematic because it is structural. It is not enforced by a
tyrant or boss – there may not even be a direct oppressor. Exploitation is perpetuated
through everyday actions. It is the product of social relations between groups. These
relations create decision-making structures or procedures and divisions of labor. The
former dictates who has authority to make decisions as well as rules and procedures that
enable, promote, and affect certain decisions like the legal system. The latter defines
work, distributes tasks, determines compensation, and establishes value of labor. Both
decision-making structures and the division of labor institutionalize these rules or
relations, creating a continuous pattern of power transfers. Transference constitutes the
second feature of exploitation. These transfers indicate processes, not mere exchanges
that occur at specific times like distributive models of exploitation suggest. These
processes occur through social relations that are constantly in flux. Through these
relations, one group can appropriate the powers of another group (Young 1990). Third,
power to Young can be considered “a general capacity to act” (Allen 2008). These
capacities are abilities to produce and alter states. It is the means to agency.
Exploitation thereby shifts capacities to act from one group to another through
social relations. For economic issues, instances of exploitation are often obvious. When
employers underpay their employees to increase profit, they take purchasing power from
these employees and empower themselves. These instances are often clear exchanges,
and they may even fit distributive models of exploitation. For social issues, however,
instances of exploitation tend to be less clear. In Justice and the Politics of Difference,
Young highlights several instances of gender exploitation, which can be used as a model.

19

For example, women are regularly compelled to complete a disproportionate number of
household chores. Consequently, men are freed for other pursuits (1990). In these
relationships, there is not a single instance of exchange, but men have increased
capacities to act because women’s capacities are transferred through gendered household
labor. Regarding both economic and social issues, nonetheless, one group’s power is
systematically transferred to another.
Marginalization
In informal discussion, marginalization is regularly conflated with oppression
generally. For instance, any given social group may experience several faces of
oppression that could include or exclude marginalization, yet that group is still regularly
referred to as marginalized. While this use of marginalization may not have significant
consequences, it obscures the experience of this face. Nonetheless, marginalization is a
much narrower, specific experience that can have dangerous consequences. Young even
suggests that this face may have the most detrimental effects, often leading to material
deprivation and – in extreme cases – even extermination. These effects may arise from
the sheer inability of marginalized groups to wield their power to influence their
environment and broader society. Unlike exploitation, marginalization is not concerned
with any process or transference. Groups that experience marginalization may have
significant power through their relations; they are unable to wield it in certain contexts,
however. Marginalization then is an experience of preemption. It prevents the capacity to
act by isolating agents from things on which to impose their will (Young 1990).
Through marginalization, social groups are “expelled from useful participation in
social life” (Young 1990). This expulsion is not merely exclusion from social interactions
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or socializing, which would characterize social distancing or quarantine as
marginalization. Allen (2008) argues that marginalization, along with exploitation and
powerlessness, are concerned with the social and economic division of labor; however,
she does not discuss how this exclusion affects access to decision-making. It limits or
eliminates groups’ access to decision-making structures and procedures by preventing
“the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized ways” (Young
1990). These ways are most of society’s productive activities, and they occur through
social cooperation. This cooperation refers to the division of labor and decision-making
structures and procedures that sustain and organize society. Marginalization, therefore,
has both economic and political implications.
For an economic example, groups’ power cannot be direct towards useful
participation in the economy, meaning members are often denied legally sanctioned
valuable jobs or careers. This condition is foundational for many instances of exploitation
since individuals are coerced into exploitative labor to make ends meet. These economic
implications often force marginalized group members into illicit or menial sectors. That
work also affects cultural imperialism when these marginalized groups are stereotyped in
those positions. Marginalization also involves political participation. It is perhaps most
blatant when groups are denied basic rights supposedly guaranteed to citizenry. That
includes the right to vote. Yet, explicitly denying participation is not the baseline; any
attempt to limit or eliminate participation prevents groups’ capacity to act or ability to
engage with society in productive, recognized ways is marginalization. For example,
placing insufficient polling places in a locality marginalizes groups by significantly
increasing the burden to access decision-making structures and procedures. Ultimately,
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policies or practices are marginalizing when they exclude or block meaningful and
productive participation in economic, political, or social activities that sustain and
organize society.
Powerlessness
While the nomenclature suggests a static state, powerlessness – like exploitation
and marginalization – is experienced through systemic social relations. It exhibits a
situation in which groups are relegated to the status of passive subjects. They are rarely
able to exercise power, yet they undergo the consequences of its execution. In society,
groups that experience powerlessness are situated where they have little ability to
influence decision-making structures and procedures. Regarding the division of labor,
that position limits opportunity to develop and exercise skills (Young 1990). Since power
is a relational capacity to act dispersed throughout society (Allen 2008), powerlessness is
not an experience of absence. Social relations render the powerless underdeveloped.
Powerless groups do not have less power as a thing that can be possessed; instead, they
have limited influence in society based on positioning (Young 1990).
Whereas marginalization relates to actions, powerlessness refers to capacity.
Powerlessness is a condition where relation within structures and institutions hinder
capacities. Powerless groups have relatively less ability to act in a recognized and
respected way according to society. This underdevelopment is regularly expressed as less
education, knowledge, or expertise. Powerless people may be considered less educated or
intelligent, but this characterization is oppressive because it disables the ability to affect
their own situation. They are granted less autonomy, and they do not get to express
creativity or independent judgment in their work. Powerless people often behave
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awkwardly or abnormally in influential or bureaucratic settings like the courthouse or
DMV. Essentially, powerless groups are portrayed as people that do not belong in
important settings (Young 1990).
According to Young, the powerless have comparatively less “authority, status,
and sense of self.” She identifies powerlessness in the differences between professionals
and nonprofessionals. She highlights three major differences that express powerlessness
in this relation. First, professionals’ work has “an expansive, progressive character,”
meaning it is considered with continued development. In their work, they garner expertise
or specialization. Professional work has an educational prerequisite of, at a minimum,
four-year degrees. As professionals develop or progress in their field, they gain more
recognition or status. Nonprofessionals often do not have these opportunities. They are
afforded limited chances to gain knowledge or earn promotions. Second,
nonprofessionals are allowed limited autonomy. They are given orders from
professionals, and they have little freedom to deviate or express creativity and
independent judgment. This division extends to nearly every aspect of social life. These
groups live separately, and they tend to develop different cultures and lifestyles (Young
1990).
These different lifestyles extend into the third difference – nonprofessionals are
not respected. According to Young, respectability is a relation of influence. When people
are respected, other people tend to show them willingness to listen and do as requested.
Nonprofessionals are not shown this respect. Professionalism is associated with
respectability in society, meaning lifestyles and behaviors associated with professionals
are required for influence. When nonprofessionals are placed in settings of respect, they
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are expected to behave according to professional standards. However, they rarely have
opportunities to learn and practice these standards. Even if they can behave appropriately,
when their nonprofessional status is revealed, they are respected less. Therefore, groups
that experience powerless have disabled or underdeveloped influence (Young 1990).
These three differences between professionals and nonprofessionals are not
unique to this relation, however. Many other groups experience powerlessness, and it is
exemplified by undeveloped or underdeveloped capacities. Minorities and women are
often not respected even if they are professionals (Young 1990). Many people who are
considered disabled have limited ability because social relations constrain capacity
development. These people are not given the accommodations required for action in
many settings. In powerlessness generally, social relations disable potential ability. The
powerless are inhibited from action, not by barriers nor constriction but by structures and
institutions that disable.
Cultural imperialism
Whereas the three prior faces of oppression primarily focus on the division of
labor because they have to do more with concrete power, the latter two faces are
primarily concerned with culture, but they all affect decision-making. Culture is the
assortment and creation of meaning. Through cultural imperialism, dominant groups
constrain non-dominant groups’ cultures through erasure and stereotyping.
Young uses culture to describe groups’ meanings developed through shared
experiences, which includes communication and interpretation in society. Regarding
communication, people convey meaning in ways defined by culture. It includes the
expressions that people use to relate and indicate shared experiences, histories, and
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interpretations. These expressions can include practices and norms. People regularly act
according to these culturally acceptable practices and norms, which are perpetuated by
structures and institutions. From greeting to departure, culture influences interactions, but
norms in these interactions are not uniform between cultures. For example, French
cultures and American cultures are often perplexed by the intimacy of the other sets’
greetings: Americans are unlikely to kiss when greeting, and the French are unlikely to
hug when greeting. These differences exemplify social relations that distinguish groups.
Cultural expressions differ between groups due to different shared experiences that
inform interpretation of meaning. Through interpretation, groups identify significance.
They determine values, and they identify important events, practices, goals, and
achievements. Interpretation also informs the meaning within expressions, and it can
even decide the value of other cultures or groups within a given groups’ perspective.
These interpretations underscore cultures’ understanding of the world and their place in
it. Different cultures do not necessarily conflict, but cultural imperialism occurs when the
dominant culture imposes their perspective on other cultures.
Through cultural imperialism, dominant cultures deny the perspective or
experience of non-dominant groups. When speaking about imperialism generally, people
typically allude to colonialism – dominant or powerful countries extend their reign over
other countries. In this context, however, imperialism is not necessarily pursued by the
state nor between countries. In cultural imperialism, non-dominant groups are subjected
to the communications and interpretations of dominant cultures. Meanings from
dominant cultures are most widely disseminated in media and everyday actions (Young
1990); dominant groups’ privilege gives them primacy over the means to interpretation
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and communication (Fraser 1987). Therefore, dominant expressions are considered
normal, and dominant interpretations are considered correct. The dominant groups’
experience comes to represent humanity entirely (Young 1990).
Through this universalization of dominant cultures, non-dominant cultures are
made invisible. The meanings of experiences are erased or hidden by the prominence of
dominant cultures (Young 1990). This erasure is often present when recounting past
events. For example, narratives about Manifest Destiny tend to focus on American
Exceptionalism instead of Indigenous genocide. When dominant groups encounter other
cultures, they regularly rationalize them by imposing dominant meanings or norms. This
subjection marks non-dominant cultures as deviant and inferior (Young 1990).
Dominant groups’ cultural meanings also regularly prescribe essences to these
other groups, which is often underscored by that perceived deviance and inferiority.
These essences are stereotypes about characters or behaviors that mark non-dominant
groups as the Other. This mark begets simplicity – members of non-dominant groups are
not allowed the complexity of individuals. Dominant cultures suggest that these other
groups do not range in character or qualities. These non-dominant groups are made into
monoliths whereas dominant group members have the privilege of personality and
uniqueness (Young 1990).
Non-dominant groups’ culture is often simultaneously invalidated by both
invisibility and stereotyping. However, these groups still share experiences – they
communicate expressions and interpretations about the world, which inform their
lifestyles. Since these non-dominant groups have their own culture and they must incur
the imposition of dominant meanings, they regularly experience double consciousness,
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wherein they both see themselves in their own perspective as well as the perspective of
dominant groups (Young 1990). This duality enables members of non-dominant groups
to more easily recognize the structures and institutions that perpetuate each face of
oppression.
Through these experiences, cultural imperialism is widely present and observed in
society. It often describes the experience of racial minorities, for instance. Through
erasure, Black Americans’ influence of music and dominant culture is ignored. Through
stereotypes, Black Americans are portrayed as criminals. This cultural imperialism
characterizes Black Americans as the Other in dominant cultural meanings.
Violence
The last face of oppression is systematic violence. When Young refers to violence
in the context of oppression, she is not focused on individual instances, though they may
be examples of this face. Violence as a face of oppression refers to systemic attack on
members of social groups motivated by their membership within those groups. This face
includes systematic attacks, harassment, intimidation, or ridicule employed to degrade,
humiliate, or stigmatize group members. This systematic character results from the social
context surrounding this violence, which makes these actions common social practices
(Young 1990).
Throughout society, many members of non-dominant social groups must fear
violence directed at them for their membership. Therefore, they are victims of this face
not only by being acted on directly but also having to live with “daily knowledge” that
they may be subjected to violence. They must fear this violence because everyone is
aware that these actions are commonplace. These violent instances have happened before,
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and they will happen again (Young 1990). That character is present in policy brutality.
Black men regularly die during routine traffic stops, and they are compelled to fear this
potential with every interaction with police officers.
The threat of violence compels certain behavior, thereby undermining nondominant group members’ freedom and dignity. To avoid the exercise of violence, they
must act accordingly, and even then, they are not safe (Young 1990). Women must avoid
walking the streets alone, especially at night, for example. The regularity of this violence
as a social practice demonstrates dominant cultural interpretations. Systematic violence
approaches legitimacy in many settings. People are not surprised when this violence
occurs, and many people suggest or overtly claim that this violence is justified. The
perpetrators hardly incur strict punishment for these actions. Referring again to police
brutality, people are not surprised by these killings, and despite visible suffering from
Black communities and families, there are many people who side with murderers because
their position enables them to enact violence by protecting them through dominant
structures and institutions. Therefore, dominant interpretations convey that this violence
is tolerable because it affects people who are viewed as lesser or undeserving of justice.
This tolerance is widely recognized. Despite regular and obvious instances of injustice,
violence remains inevitable through that tolerance.
Identifying Oppression in Content
Indiana’s voter identification law was selected because its unique place in the
literature. Indiana’s law was the first of its kind, and after the Supreme Court upheld it,
many states followed suit. This project is a case study since that scope enables qualitative
detail required to analyze intent. The respondents’ case briefs supporting Indiana’s voter
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identification law are employed in this study because they present the most cogent
arguments in favor of the law from those who are charged with defending it. This project
is not meant to analyze the legal validity of these arguments; instead, it interprets and
analyzes them according to Young’s normative theory of justice. Therefore, this project
engages in an interpretive, qualitative content analysis.
While perhaps uncommon, political theory may be applied in empirical research
to conjure a better understanding of dynamic phenomena. When they work together,
political theory provides a framework for analyzing and interpreting phenomena
according to normative concepts and principles whereas qualitative research provides the
empirical trends and patterns subject to this theory (Zapata-Barrero 2018). In this
instance, applied political theory and qualitative research enables conclusions about
justice and oppression. Since case briefs are unlikely to overtly state oppressive intent,
there is some need for contextual interpretation. Drisko and Maschi distinguish
interpretive content analysis from basic content analysis by the former’s ability to explore
latent meaning in the context of communications. When these communications or content
are interpreted in the context that they are made, conveyed, and received, researchers can
make inferences about the communicators’ meaning or intentions. Interpretive content
analysis regularly begins inductively with preliminary raw data. Researchers form
emergent coding by identifying themes within content. They expose these themes to
connotative codes that are based on overall meaning, not explicit words. These codes are
created through contextual knowledge and theories (2018). In this project, those emergent
themes are arguments within respondents’ case briefs supporting Indiana’s voter
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identification law to the Supreme Court of the United States, and those codes are
determined by Young’s political theory.
Young’s five faces of oppression have been used in this type of content analysis
before. Some researchers employed Young’s faces to analyze interviews with Mexican
immigrant mothers. Their study identified all five faces of oppression in the women’s
experiences. These interactions with oppressive institutions and structures ranged from
exploitation through lower wages to violence through threats of sexual assault (Ayón et al
2018). Like this project, these researchers interpreted language in context to identify
elements of political theory. Both interpretation and political theory are required to infer
meaning and determine normative value.
Ayón et al. (2018) uses political theory to code experiences of oppression whereas
this project employs the same political theory to identify and judge intent. In my project,
I familiarized myself with the context in which the voter identification law was
introduced and passed in Indiana, and I created detailed descriptions of Young’s five
faces of oppression. That information was used to identify emergent themes or arguments
in the respondents’ case briefs for the United States Supreme Court with oppressive
meaning, thereby suggesting whether there was oppressive intent behind the law.
Notably, Young’s five faces express experiences of oppression, not advocacy
intent. Translating these accounts into mechanisms for identifying oppressive meaning or
intent presents some challenges. These challenges are not insurmountable, nonetheless.
The oppressive themes were found by extrapolating Young’s five faces of oppression that
detail experiences of oppressed social groups into coded language that promotes
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experiences of exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and
violence for non-dominant social groups.
In this project, I identified the emergent arguments by pulling quotes or premises.
Then, I interpreted them in context and subjected them to the tenets of Young’s five faces
of oppression. If these quotes demonstrated support or embrace for these faces, they were
coded as demonstrating meanings of that given face. In the descriptions below, these
faces were described as mutually exclusive; therefore, any given quote is only coded as
belonging to one face. Nonetheless, if there are multiple instances of a face, the argument
is said to have oppressive intent, specifically related to that face. Since proponents are
unlikely to say that they support voter identification to oppress certain social groups, I
distinguished premises or quotes in their arguments as implicit or explicit. This
distinction was mostly descriptive, and it functioned to highlight clarity of the
respondents’ intent. Nonetheless, this scheme created eleven mutually exclusive
categories, including five categories that explicitly express each face, five categories that
implicitly express each face, and one when oppressive meaning is not present.
Exploitation
Exploitative intentions are expressed through interests in perpetuating systemic
transfers of powers. Arguments that express exploitation would indicate a direct
relationship of transference or exchange between two or more parties. Therefore, they
would likely be coded in concerns of value or benefit. Explicit oppressive intentions
could argue in favor of advantage-taking. Proponents could suggest that vulnerabilities
permit this advantage-taking, even suggesting that powerful or privileged people have the
right to exploit disadvantaged or historically oppressed social groups. They could also
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argue for enriching or empowering social groups at the obvious expense of others.
Implicit arguments with oppressive intent would be less direct about advantage-taking or
transfers of value and benefit, but these ideas would still be present. These arguments
could delegitimize or reject claims of entitlement to protect transference or value. They
could suggest that a privileged group deserves or earns the value or benefit taken from
another group because that privileged group meets certain requirements.
Marginalization
Marginalization is expressed in arguments that attempt to isolate agents from
effectively participating in society. This face is seen in language of barriers and burdens
that disallow groups from executing their capacities to participate or influence decisionmaking structures and procedures or the division of labor. Explicit arguments for
marginalization would purposely aim to block or burden social participation within
decision-making structures and procedures or the division of labor to decrease social
participation. These arguments could deny people’s rights to participate in society. They
could argue that decreased participation is not a problem; in fact, decreased participation
may be viewed as beneficial.
Implicit arguments for marginalization would likely support burdens and barriers
to participation as a means to securing and maintaining structures and institutions within
decision-making procedures or the division of labor. These arguments could suggest that
burdens and barriers are necessary for effective social participation, not unfortunate
consequences of structures and institutions. They would justify barriers and burdens
through precedent, suggesting that other barriers and burdens make new ones accepted or
needed. These arguments may suggest that other structures or institutions need
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reconsidered if the given one is problematic. Implicit arguments could also include
efforts to diminish the barring effect of structures and institutions by emphasizing
comparably worse or explicit examples.
Powerlessness
Intentions underscored by powerlessness will support efforts to render people
unable to act. These arguments would suggest constraining or limiting opportunities to
develop that capacity, or they would deny how that development is already constrained
by structures and institutions. Explicit arguments for powerlessness could seek to disable
the ability to develop skills or qualities required for work or participation. They could
argue that disabling structures or institutions are necessary, which could be excused by
resource scarcity or unmet qualities. Therefore, these arguments could state that a
disabling effect is not proper justification for policy approval or rejection, including
historical instances of disproportionate underdevelopment.
Implicit arguments for powerlessness would express tacit support of disabling
structures and institutions. These arguments could deny that disabling structures and
institutions exist, which is often hidden in language of personal responsibility for
capacity development. They could dismiss or ignore the inability for people to launch a
challenge to oppression because their powerless position, or they could argue in favor or
structures and institutions that disable capacity development. These arguments for
powerlessness could also downplay or diminish the importance of disparity in capacities
or possession.
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Cultural Imperialism
Arguments for cultural imperialism will apply or impose dominant meanings on
other cultures. These arguments will express either erasure or stereotypes, and they may
express both. Explicit arguments for cultural imperialism could label other cultural
practices or uncommon lifestyles as inferior or wrong, and these arguments could compel
people to adjust their practices and lifestyles to act according to normal or dominant
cultural expressions. They could also deny the right to existence of different cultures and
lifestyles. Explicit arguments for cultural imperialism could include generalizations or
stereotypes about groups of people, ascribing that characterization as an essence, and they
could justify certain treatment based on these assumed essences.
Implicit arguments for cultural imperialism would include similar but more
concealed erasure or stereotypes. These arguments could diminish the importance of
social group or culture belonging by stressing neutrality or color-blindness. They could
diminish the value of other practices or lifestyles, suggesting that dominant cultures are
more valuable or correct. They could suggest that other lifestyles or cultures only exist on
the fringes of society, stressing their seeming infeasibility or unimportance. They could
deny the significance of meanings or gestures to other people. These arguments could
overextend vague assumptions about groups of people, not describing them as essential
qualities but not offering nuance about diversity within those groups.
Violence
Arguments for violence would legitimize or support systematic attacks to damage,
humiliate, or destroy people or their property. They would support attempts to harass,
intimidate, or ridicule to degrade, humiliate, or stigmatize non-dominant social group
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members. These arguments would legitimize systematic violence. Explicit arguments for
violence could overtly call for violence against people, encouraging listeners or detailing
plans to attack members of non-dominant social groups. These arguments could
legitimize systemic violence against people by claiming violence is acceptable or
tolerable, and they could even argue that they are necessary. Explicit arguments for
violence could justify this violence by stating that it is deserved.
Implicit arguments for violence would more subtly encourage violence. They may
advocate for roughness or harshness. They could suggest that something should happen
to certain people without specifying what action should take place. These arguments
could make excuses for or downplay the threat or frequency of known systematic
violence. They could suggest that systematic violence is just how the world works.
Finding Oppressive Meaning in Voter Identification
Within the respondents’ case briefs in support of Indiana’s voter identification
law, there are numerous premises that convey oppressive meaning, and when they are
interpreted in the proper context, these arguments demonstrate oppressive intent.
Throughout the briefs, there are oppressive arguments in four of five faces of oppression:
there are arguments that express exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and
cultural imperialism. This section highlights quotes that express premises with oppressive
meaning, and it demonstrates how these premises and arguments are interpreted to
convey oppressive intent.
Exploitation
In many settings, exploitation is viewed merely as economic. That view is present
in most experiences characterized as exploitation. These experiences are often
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encapsulated by unfair wages and poor working conditions. However, as the earlier
description of exploitation demonstrated, this face has many social applications outside
economic distribution issues. In their case brief for Indiana’s voter identification law, the
state respondents employ premises with exploitative meaning.
As displayed earlier, exploitation requires a transfer of powers between two or
more parties. That transfer improves certain people’s capacity to act at the expense of
others, and in this context, that capacity to act is the ability to vote. The respondents
employ this face when they discuss the value of votes. They argue that Indiana’s voter
identification law protects the value of eligible voters.
The Voter ID Law protects the franchise by ensuring that those who meet
substantive eligibility requirements have their votes counted at full strength,
undiluted by ineligible voters (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This implicit premise shows how the respondents use eligibility as a crux for exploitation.
Despite common allusion to voter impersonation, fraudulent is not synonymous with
ineligibility in their arguments. In fact, the connection between these attributes is unclear
if even present. Therefore, eligibility is not a measure of fraud; instead, it is a structure
meant to improve votes’ value for people “who meet substantive eligibility requirements”
(Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008) at the expense of groups who cannot
meet these requirements.
While eligibility can be a justifiable reason to deny voting, these “substantive
eligibility requirements” are not necessarily accurate measures of eligibility. They are
additional requirements to prevented dilution of power, making some groups – who
would otherwise be eligible if not for the voter identification requirement – ineligible.
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That structure thereby transfers the power of newly ineligible voters to eligible voters.
The respondents explicitly indicate that this requirement benefits some groups at the
expense of others.
Requiring indigents and religious objectors to validate their ballots at the clerk’s
office benefits the electorate as a whole (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.
2008).
This quote explicitly demonstrates that some oppressed groups’ ineligibility or difficulty
is beneficial for other groups. It demonstrates that ineligibility in this argument
characterizes historically oppressed groups.
Exploitation is clear in this argument when interpreted in the proper context. In
Indiana, elections determine representation in districts with a given population. For many
districts, that population affects where districts’ boundaries are drawn, and it determines
the available value of each vote by its relation to the elected official, meaning officials’
mandate is based on population. These votes have relative weight or value based on its
influence in elections, and that relative weight increases when fewer people vote. This
phenomenon underscores many critiques of the Electoral College (Durran 2017), but that
conversation compares districts. In a given district, each vote has less relative influence
when more people vote than when fewer people do. Therefore, this argument is about
turnout, and as the literature displays, Republicans have expressed desires to decrease
turnout because they feel it helps them win elections.
This interest is notable in competitive elections. Increasing the pool of
“ineligible” voters even marginally can sway elections in competitive districts, and
Republicans in Indiana introduced this law when elections were competitive, as
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Republicans have done across the country. When this law was introduced, there were
numerous claims that it would disadvantage oppressed groups, and since the Republican
coalition is increasingly comprised of privileged groups, Republicans knew that their
coalition was less likely to be affected by this law. In this context, this argument suggests
that Republicans introduced this law to increase the value of “eligible” votes, which
would likely contain more privileged people, at the overt expense of newly “ineligible”
voters, likely including more historically oppressed groups. 3 Since premises underlying
this argument indicate exploitative meaning, the respondents’ argument that the voter
identification law increases or gives full strength to voters has oppressive intent. While
this argument relies on exploitation, it is supported by arguments that support decreased
social participation, which is marginalization.
Marginalization
When groups are marginalized, they are ostracized. They are excluded from social
participation and cooperation. They cannot fully influence events or environments. When
referencing decision-making structures and procedures, that influence is perhaps most
clearly embodied by voting. Hence, disenfranchisement is a clear example of
marginalization. But structures and institutions need not be that extreme to be
marginalizing. They can marginalize through various degrees of barriers and burdens that
can deter or immobilize social groups from participating. In arguments for Indiana’s

Exploitation within the US electoral system is not new: it is most clearly represented in an infamous
original provision of the US Constitution. The Three-Fifths Compromise transferred the powers of Black
Americans to White Americans. According to this agreement, slaves would be counted as three-fifths a
person for direct taxation and representation (Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 2020). Slaves’ power was
not only transferred to masters through their labor; their capacity to act was transferred to White Americans
by increasing the value of their vote based on slaves’ mere existence. Slaves’ ineligibility did not decrease
the available power, but it increased the relative value or weight of non-slaves’ votes.
3
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voter identification, there are premises that express marginalizing meaning by justifying
disproportionate burden to social participation for certain groups.
Marginalization is most clearly expressed in respondents’ arguments to prevent
the court from applying strict scrutiny to Indiana’s voter identification law. This form of
judicial review is the highest standard used to determine constitutionality. When strict
scrutiny is applied, laws must demonstrate compelling government interest, and they
must narrowly accomplish that interest. These stringent rules are often applied in cases of
alleged discrimination (Legal Information Institute n.d. b). Since strict scrutiny
necessitates that laws meet more stringent requirements, there is obviously a greater
chance that laws will be struck down when it is applied.
The respondents clearly do not want strict scrutiny to be applied. This idea alone
presents concerns. If the respondents were confident that law is not oppressive, strict
scrutiny would not present a problem for the law. However, the respondents explicitly
state that this law could have marginalizing effects.
All States have enacted complex election laws, each provision of which ‘will
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters’ (Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote is explicitly marginalizing because it argues that barriers are necessary for
effective social participation. According to this premise, burdens are necessary for secure
elections, meaning burdens alone should not require courts to apply stringent
requirements for review. The respondents argue that these burdens are justified by the
state’s compelling interest to secure its elections.
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State’s compelling interest in preventing fraud through the Voter ID Law
outweighs the minimal burdens the Law imposes on the right to vote (Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
That premise is implicitly marginalizing because it downplays the burdens, and it
suggests that potential immobilization is necessary. With this premise, they stress that the
law does include some mitigation of this burden by offering exemptions for religious
objectors and poor people. However, even these mitigating factors include some burden
by requiring these people to incur additional burdens after the election. These burdens are
even more excessive when considering how hard it can be to obtain the proper
identification in Indiana, especially during the time constraints. Nonetheless, they argue
that these burdens are required to prevent fraud and facilitate fair elections.
While the respondents argue that the mitigating policies address these barriers,
they do not hold that lost participation is a problem. The respondents dismiss these
burdens by denying the importance of social participation. They downplay negative
impacts by contrasting this law with more burdensome laws, including infamous
examples of voter suppression.
The Voter ID Law is unlike other election regulations that the Court has subjected
to strict scrutiny, such as poll taxes, durational residency requirements, and
property-ownership qualifications. The Court has expressly distinguished between
such substantive voter qualifications and benign procedural safeguards, such as
advance registration requirements. The former was suspect because the State
totally denied the franchise to an entire class of residents that had no way to gain
eligibility to vote…Like voter registration, the Voter ID Law provides procedural
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protection of election integrity and is not subject to strict scrutiny. At most, it is
subject to relatively mild review that balances the State’s compelling interest in
preventing election fraud against the minor burdens imposed by the Law
(Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote is coded as implicitly marginalizing because it attempts to downplay the
burdens and barriers associated with the law by suggesting that these restrictions could be
worse, as if equivalence to known instances of oppression is required to be oppressive.
That premise indicates that they are not majorly concerned with decreased social
participation. This position is even more explicitly stated in continued comparisons,
specifically with voter registration.
If immediate ability to vote is the measurement of the “severity” of a voting law,
the Voter ID Law is far less burdensome than Indiana’s voter registration law.
Even assuming (unrealistically) that the Voter ID Law prevents 43,000 citizens
who supposedly lack photo identification from voting, by parity logic, Indiana’s
voter-registration law prevents over 1.5 million individuals from voting, which is
33.2% of 2004 VAP. This represents 35 times more ‘severity’ than the Voter ID
Law. Yet, presumably, no one would argue that voter-registration laws impose a
“severe burden” on voting (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
In this quote, the respondents explicitly demonstrate that they do not consider decreased
social participation a problem, which is marginalizing – they imply that severity should
not be determined by exclusion. The respondents show that they are not concerned with
people who are excluded from social participation by this law. Republicans generally
have indicated that they prefer elections with less participation, and they have taken
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repeated steps to demobilize the electorate throughout the nation because they believe it
helps them win. Naturally, that interest would inform actions in states with competitive
elections, which Indiana was at the time.
Arguments for electoral integrity that are truly committed to democracy and
justice would not shy from stringent tests that are meant to prevent discrimination or
disproportionate burden. These arguments should welcome these challenges as means to
securing elections without perpetuating oppression and dominance. However, the
Republican coalition is increasingly comprised of privileged groups that would not be
affected by these phenomena, and this party has expressed interest in decreasing
participation. Nationally, they have introduced voter identification laws in states with
competitive elections and increasing diversity. In Indiana, Republicans enacted this law
after obtaining a trifecta in state government for the first time in decades. In this context,
respondents’ argument to dismiss measures to protect historically oppressed social groups
indicate a vested interest in perpetuating structures that privilege certain groups at the
expense of others. Even if Republicans were not pursuing marginalization, this context
with this argument against strict scrutiny demonstrates that decreased social participation
would be a fortunate consequence for Republicans. Therefore, this argument within this
context is classified as having marginalizing intent. Republicans did not enact policies to
effectively mitigate burden for historically oppressed groups; instead, their mitigation
included additional burdens, and they turned to individual responsibility to dismiss
challenges, which employs powerlessness.
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Powerlessness
When people experience powerlessness, they are inhibited from developing
capacities to act. These people are often considered underdeveloped or unable to
complete normal or respectable tasks. They often cannot control their own environment
or situation. Powerlessness is produced through relations to structures or institutions that
render other groups underdeveloped or unable to act. These relations can be embodied by
standards or requirements that are easier to achieve by privileged social groups. Young
demonstrates these standards through respectability (1990). In these case briefs, these
standards are embodied by eligibility. The respondents employ arguments with
oppressive intent in two ways: 1) ignoring the power required to challenge structures and
institutions in court and 2) downplaying the difficulty of obtaining identification.
First, respondents make clear that the petitioners do not belong to the group that
would be disenfranchised by this law. They begin their case by attempting to dismiss the
challenge because people who are potentially disenfranchised did not pose the challenge.
None of the Petitioners in this case is a registered voter who cannot vote because
of the Voter ID Law (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote is coded as an implicit premise of powerlessness because it ignores the
structures that makes this fact. In context, this argument clearly demonstrates support for
powerlessness. Challenging structures and institutions through the legal system requires
people in or associated with respected and empowered positions. People in these
positions must obtain law degrees to express the competency required to challenge the
laws in ways that are recognized and respected by society. Both the respondents and
opponents of voter identification acknowledge that the potential disenfranchised groups

43

do not have these traits. These potential affected groups include people who are largely
disadvantaged by many structures and institutions. They likely would not have the skills
or relations to bring a challenge to the court themselves, and they would not be obviously
identifiable by people who attempt to challenge this law on their behalf. Considering
many respected or recognized activities in society do require photo identification, people
who could be disenfranchised with this law likely would have limited experience or
knowledge about these activities. Since the respondents obviously rely on premises that
have meanings of powerlessness, these arguments employ intent of powerlessness to
combat the challenge to voter identification.
Second, the respondents consistently deny and ignore the difficulties associated
with obtaining an acceptable form of photo identification even though they were provided
with evidence. As the context section displays, lawmakers were provided ample evidence
that obtaining identification is a difficult process for people in disadvantaged social
groups – they may not have the proper documents, evidence, or means to receive a state
issued photo ID. Nevertheless, the respondents do not accommodate for this inability;
instead, they suggest that this struggle is exaggerated.
As for the hypothetical, minuscule percentage of voters who must yet procure
government-issued photo identification to be able to vote in-person, Petitioners
unfairly atomize each step of the process to make it appear an impossible
task…They stress the difficulty of acquiring a birth certificate, secondary
document, and proof of address, and the need to travel to the BMV, ignoring the
fact that voters without identification need only gather these documents once and
need not wait until after casting a provisional ballot to do so. The way Petitioners
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describe the process, it is a wonder any Indiana citizens are licensed to drive, let
alone able to vote (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This premise is coded as implicit meaning of powerlessness because it readily ignores – if
not perpetuates – structures that make this process difficult, despite that these structures
were made clear by testimony from the interim Executive Director of the Lafayette Urban
Ministry and that the state of Indiana purposefully made obtaining state issue photo
identification more difficult to combat fraud.
The respondents purposefully ignore this evidence of structures and institutions
that make this process hard for historically oppressed groups. They contend that this
obviously new requirement cannot be considered such. Instead, the voter identification
law is merely a different policy for proving identity.
It does not establish any new criteria for voting, but instead provided a reasonable
method of verifying voter identity – a fundamental, pre-existing voter-eligibility
requirement (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote has implicit meaning of powerlessness because it is a disingenuous attempt to
dismiss these known challenges. Before the law was enacted, people did not have to
provide photo identification; therefore, this new requirement is clearly a new criterion.
People do not just need to verify their identity – they must provide a specific form of
proof. The respondents dismiss that some people may be incapable of providing that
proof. The respondents deflect from difficulties associated with compliance by
highlighting the accommodations the law does make.
Finally, Indiana’s Voter ID Law contains several safeguards to accommodate the
1% of VAP allegedly without government-issued photo identification. The BMV
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must issue non-license photo identification free to voters who need it. Voters who
arrive at the polls without identification may cast a provisional ballot and validate
it within 10 days at the county clerk’s office – far more time than the 48 hours
recommended by the Carter-Baker Commission, Indigents who must pay a fee to
obtain identification (such as for a birth certificate) and religious objectors may
cast provisional ballots and validate them without identification. The Law does
not apply to mail-in absentee ballots, so the elderly and disabled will not need
photo identification (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote is coded as implicit meaning of powerlessness because it ignores the
challenges still included by these accommodations. The respondents clearly ignore the
structures and institutions that even underscore these accommodations.
These accommodations overtly still include burdens and barriers that many people
who are powerless would struggle to fulfill, but they highlight these accommodations to
dismiss these challenges so they can blame this disadvantaged position on individuals.
But with procedural rules, responsibility lies with voters: “if their plight can be
characterized as disenfranchisement at all, it was not caused by the law, but by
their own failure to take timely steps to affect their enrollment” (Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This premise that relies on individual responsibilities is coded as an explicit instance of
powerless because it overtly dismisses the structures and institutions that create these
difficulties. The respondents blame this underdeveloped eligibility on the individuals
instead of recognizing their status within disadvantaged, historically oppressed social
groups. Despite their attempts to deflect and ignore the challenges related to obtaining
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proper identification that is now required to vote, the respondents explicitly admit
employing powerlessness.
The effort and expense may exceed the wherewithal of many uneducated, poor,
and elderly citizens (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote indicates that these citizens may not be able to develop the capacities required
to vote according to the voter identification law, which is an explicit use of
powerlessness. Since the context in which this law was enacted demonstrates that photo
identification is not easy to obtain in Indiana and Republicans knew this fact when
advocating for the law, they clearly intended to use those structures in the law. When
paired with the fact that the Republican party is increasingly comprised of people
privileged by these same structures, this argument is interpreted as having intent of
powerlessness. The respondents employed structures and institutions to potentially render
members of historically oppressed groups underdeveloped or incapable of acting. Yet,
they consistently attempt to dismiss these same people as non-existent, which is
characterized as cultural imperialism.
Cultural Imperialism
Cultural imperialism occurs when dominant groups impose their cultural
expression and interpretations on non-dominant groups. That imposition occurs through
two experiences: erasure and essentialization. For the former, dominant groups often
universalize their own perspective or experiences, making other groups’ interpretations
and expressions invisible or inferior, which dismisses the plausibility of non-dominant
lifestyles or very existence. That inferiority also underscores essentialization, the latter
experience of cultural imperialism. This essentialization stereotypes groups by depicting
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them as defined by a certain essence or character. These two experiences can occur alone,
but they are often applied simultaneously.
Cultural imperialism is present in the respondents’ argument supporting voter
identification laws. This argument has numerous premises that attempt to erase or
stereotype non-dominant expressions or interpretations. They often characterize these
non-dominant cultures as deviant or inferior.
In light of such widespread demands for (and concomitant prevalence of)
government-issued photo identification, it is almost shocking that in late 2007
Indiana can be characterized as even unusual in requiring it at the polls (Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote implicitly demonstrates cultural imperialism by suggesting that widespread
dominant expression and interpretations render other practices deviant. It suggests that
widespread or commonplace practices are normal or correct for every process or
procedure. The respondents argue that dominant practices should extend from other
structures and institutions to the central decision-making structure or procedure in
society: voting. That effort is an attempt to universalize the meaning or interpretation of
this practice. This universalization is expressed by erasing other possible lifestyles.
Photo identification is already required for many routine activities, such as flying,
driving, cashing a check, staying in a hotel, purchasing alcohol, and renting a
video (Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This premise is coded as implicit cultural imperialism because it attempts to universalize
common dominant actions, and it interprets them as central to normal life. This assertion
ignores that these seemingly commonplace actions may not occur in every person’s life.
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There are numerous people that have never flown. There are many people that do not use
banks. When considering these actions, they obviously include some degree of privilege
to fulfill, and considering that the people that would be disenfranchised because they do
not have or cannot easily procure photo identification, they would not be expected to
undertake actions that require some degree of privilege or demonstrate dominant
structures and institutions. Since the Republican party is increasingly comprised of
privileged social groups, the Republican lawmakers would not be concerned that their
coalition is primarily affected by something that targets people unaccustomed to or
removed from these widespread or commonplace dominant practices. Therefore, this
premise displays an implicit attempt to erase these non-dominant lifestyles.
Whereas that premise is primarily erasure, it also has vague notions of an essence
of inferiority, which underscores many stereotypes. This effort to essentialize is
embodied in another premise, however.
Petitioners agree with this estimate of 99% pre-enforcement compliance, Dem.Br.
12; ACLU Br. 12, but then proceed as if the entire remaining 1% will necessarily
be burdened by the Law. They do not, however, show that any of these estimated
43,000 individuals (1) are registered to vote; and (2) would like to vote; but (3)
will be unable to vote because of the Voter ID Law (Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd. 2008).
This premise implicitly expresses cultural imperialism because it attempts to stereotype
the potentially affected group as removed or unlikely to contribute regardless. The
respondents repeatedly stress that the petitioners do not say whether affected people
would participate in elections if the law were not there to seemingly insinuate that they
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would not participate. This characterization closely aligns with many preconceived
notions about historically oppressed groups, specifically the poor and many racial
minorities. While this context is not highlighted in this paper, it is well established in
thought, and it is closely related to the earlier premises that express cultural imperialism
by universalizing dominant cultural expressions and interpretations. In context, this
premise is interpreted to characterize this small number of people as deviant – the
respondents suggest that this group is inferior by their lesser commitment to these
dominant structures and institutions, which is cultural imperialism.
Throughout the briefs, the respondents continuously stress the size of the
potentially affected group, suggesting that the small number of people affected makes the
voter identification law permissible.
Instead, Brace’s data established that 99% of Indiana’s VAP already possess
photo identification, which alone renders untenable any theory of discrimination
and process the insignificance of any burdens the Law imposes (Crawford v.
Marion County Election Bd. 2008).
This quote is coded as an explicit instance of marginalization since the respondents
attempt to dismiss any burden because that burden would affect a small number of
people. With this premise, the respondents attempt to render this group invisible. While
generally attempts to ignore groups of people is problematic regardless of size,
considering the context in which this law was introduced, that premise is even more
concerning. At the time, Indiana had competitive elections where a small number of
people could swing a district or even statewide office. Since this particular small group
would be comprised of historically oppressed people, who are increasingly members of
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the opposing party, Republicans would be interested in erasing this group to alleviate
concerns of advantageous disenfranchisement or immobilization. Therefore, this premise
demonstrates cultural imperialism. When this premise is paired with multiple others that
express cultural imperialism, the respondents’ argument clearly demonstrates intent to
impose cultural imperialism.
Violence
Unlike the other faces, there are not identifiable examples of violent intent in the
respondents’ briefs for Indiana’s voter identification law. While the respondents do
mention instances of violence, they provide merely a historical account of voter
intimidation. The respondents do not advocate for violence implicitly or explicitly. While
other proponents of voter identification may appeal to violence, that face is not present in
these briefs. Nonetheless, this finding is understandable. It is unlikely that a case brief
meant to support the law and counter arguments of discrimination in an official setting
would express support for violence. That argument would certainly be less beneficial in
court and would more clearly target historically oppressed people.
Conclusion
Despite an absence of violence, these case briefs demonstrate arguments with
oppressive intent by including multiple premises with meanings of exploitation,
marginalization, powerlessness, and cultural imperialism. This conclusion is not
surprising, however. When these arguments are interpreted in context, the Republican
party’s interest in this law is clear. Indiana’s voter identification law was introduced and
enacted in a politically advantageous moment for the Republican party. During that time,
Indiana was electorally competitive, and Indiana state Republicans introduced and
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enacted the voter identification law after achieving their first state government trifecta in
decades without a single vote from the opposition party. That action persisted through
calls of discrimination from lawmakers and community organizers, and it occurred while
racial minorities’, who typically vote for the Democratic party, proportion of Indiana’s
population increased.
This environment even exemplified national trends. Across the nation,
Republicans were most likely to enact voter identification laws in electorally competitive
states (Hicks et al. 2015) when taking control of governor’s offices and state legislatures
(Biggers and Hanmer 2017). Considering these factors, this law implies an
understandable calculation: Indiana Republicans could use their new trifecta to increase
their chances of victory in future elections by changing the rules about who could vote,
specifically decreasing the size of eligible groups that were unlikely to vote for their
party. That calculation is even more understandable when elections are competitive,
meaning a small number of votes can sway the results.
This effort is comparable to numerous anti-democratic policies and practices
embraced by the Republican party in recent decades. This embrace extends from Paul
Weyrich rooting for lower turnouts to now. There have been at least 361 new bills with
restrictive provisions introduced in forty-seven states since the 2020 election alone, for
example. Nearly twenty-five percent of these bills seeks stricter voter identification
requirements (Brennan Center for Justice 2021). These efforts exemplify a Republican
party that is willing to reject democracy. The Republican party is increasingly composed
of fewer social groups, and those groups’ proportion of the population is decreasing.
Therefore, Republicans have less potential to win a majority. That challenge is clear in
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recent presidential elections: since 2000, Republicans have lost six of the last seven
popular votes despite winning three of those elections. Consequently, decreasing the pool
of eligible voters enables Republicans to win a majority with fewer votes. This antidemocratic embrace is even more troubling because it further entrenches the dominance
of historically privileged social groups.
Indiana’s voter identification law – among many restrictive election reforms –
attempts to manipulate the decision-making structures and procedures that govern
society. This law targeted historically oppressed groups to solidify control for historically
privileged groups. By imposing barriers to voting that could imply cost or additional
effort, they created a mechanism to disenfranchise people who already lack sufficient
means common amongst privileged or dominant social groups. This barrier employed
photo identification, which represented an obvious disparity in use of and access to
dominant structures and institutions, to restrict voting eligibility. Since their party is
increasingly composed of historically privileged groups, Republicans could be confident
that this policy would not negatively affect their base regardless of whether it actually
suppressed voters. Considering that this law was introduced and enacted by historically
privileged groups, but it is relevant mostly for historically oppressed groups, there are
legitimate concerns of oppression.
This project seeks to investigate those concerns by evaluating whether there is
oppressive meaning in proponents’ arguments. That meaning is found in the respondents’
case briefs in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, which were judged by the
Supreme Court. Despite the Court upholding the law, I establish that the repeated use of
exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and cultural imperialism suggests that there
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is oppressive intent behind the law. Therefore, this law seems to align with historical
examples of voter suppression. Like literacy requirements, this law employs what may
intuitively seem to be an understandable requirement to abuse disparities. Ultimately, this
law is anti-democratic, and it seeks to perpetuate the dynamics of power in Indiana.
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